UTILITY NOT LIABLE FOR CONTRACTOR’S NEGLIGENCE

AEP Texas Central Co. v. Arredondo
Supreme Court of Texas (November 20, 2020)
Opinion by Justice Lehrmann (linked here)
Whether an owner or primary contractor can be held liable for personal injuries caused by the negligence of an independent contractor is often an important issue in cases arising out of residential, commercial, or utility construction. In AEP, the Texas Supreme Court refused to lower the bar required to impose vicarious liability in such cases.

Marta Arredondo was injured when she stepped into a hole in her yard allegedly created by the removal of a “stub pole” by T&D Solutions, a contractor hired by AEP, an electrical utility. (A stub pole is the remaining “stub” of a utility pole after the electrical wires and the top of the pole are removed.) She sued AEP and T&D; the trial court granted summary judgment for both defendants. The San Antonio Court of Appeals reversed, and the companies filed petitions for review.

The Supreme Court reiterated the general rule that “one who employs an independent contractor has no duty to ensure that the contractor performs its work in a safe manner.” That presumption can be overcome if the primary party (here, AEP) retained the right to control “the method and means” of the contractor’s work. Reversing the court of appeals and following its own holdings in similar cases, the Court rejected the proposition that sufficient control is created by contractual provisions that require (1) the contractor to “have an authorized representative at the [work site] to whom [AEP] may give instructions” or (2) the work to “be done as expeditiously as possible and the premises restored immediately.” Nor was the removal of a stub pole an “inherently dangerous” activity that would have imposed a non-delegable duty on AEP.

The Court affirmed the intermediate appeals court’s holding that T&D was not entitled to summary judgment because there was conflicting evidence of whether it had properly filled the hole after removing the pole. Arredondo’s negligence claim against T&D was remanded to the trial court.

CONTINUING TRESPASS IS NOT NECESSARILY AN IRREPARABLE INJURY

WBW Holdings, LLC v. Clamon
Dallas Court of Appeals, No. 05-20-00397-CV (November 12, 2020)
Justices Myers, Nowell (Opinion available here), and Evans
Good fences make good neighbors … sometimes. Two parties owning adjoining land became involved in a dispute about whether the boundary between their properties was the center line of the county road between them or to the south of that road. Taking the latter position, the Clamons erected a fence between the WBW property and the county road (allegedly on their property), barring WBW’s access to the road, and WBW cut the fence to regain access.

Litigation ensued, and the trial court granted a temporary injunction, enjoining WBW from crossing over the boundary asserted by the Clamons. The Clamons argued they had “no adequate remedy, short of injunctive relief, to stop WBW’s representatives from trespassing on their land” and that trespassing on land “is of such a nature that the damage to the Clamon brothers is irreparable; it simply cannot be measured by any pecuniary standard.” The Dallas Court disagreed, holding that trespass alone is not an irreparable injury. The Clamons failed to demonstrate that the alleged trespass would invade the possession of their land, destroy the use and enjoyment of their land, or cause potential loss of rights in real property. With no evidence of a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury, the trial court erred in granting the injunction.

CHALLENGING PERSONAL JURISDICTION? DECIDE FAST

Aaron Kaufman v. AmeriHealth Laboratory, LLC
Dallas Court of Appeals, No. 05-20-00504-CV (October 30, 2020)
Justices Molberg, Carlyle, and Browning (Opinion, linked here)

Does an attorney’s appearance and participation in a TRO hearing and entrance into a Rule 11 agreement constitute a general appearance? Yes, under certain circumstances.

AmeriHealth Laboratory executed a consulting agreement with Final Inch, a Florida corporation, which was signed by Final Inch’s CEO, Aaron Kaufman, a Florida resident. AmeriHealth later sued both Kaufman and Final Inch. It also sought a TRO.

The trial court granted the TRO the same day the lawsuit was filed, after a non-transcribed hearing. However, Kaufman’s attorney appeared at the hearing, did not limit his appearance on Kaufman’s behalf, and actively argued against the entrance of the TRO by challenging the underlying facts concerning his client’s personal liability.

After the hearing, the trial court ordered the parties to confer concerning expedited discovery. The parties reached an agreement, which the court orally entered into the record. The Rule 11 agreement also extended the TRO. Kaufman’s attorney confirmed the agreement, making one modification to the discovery requests. He also agreed with AmeriHealth’s request for the trial court to order compliance with the parties’ agreement.

Kaufman filed his special appearance a week later, arguing that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The trial court denied the special appearance, and the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that his attorney’s actions on the day the lawsuit was filed constituted a general appearance and waived the grounds asserted in the special appearance.

A party makes a general appearance if, without limitation, the party “(1) invokes the judgment of the court on any question other than the court’s jurisdiction, (2) recognizes by its acts that an action is properly pending, or (3) seeks affirmative relief from the court.”

While noting that simply appearing at an ancillary hearing, such as on a TRO application, does not always waive jurisdictional objections, the Court of Appeals found the attorney’s level of active participation here did. Kaufman’s attorney was not an “observer or silent figurehead.” He challenged the underlying facts supporting the TRO, and he “sought and obtained affirmative relief” in the Rule 11 agreement. These activities prior to filing a special appearance distinguished the conduct from other cases holding that an appearance on matters that are “prior to the main suit” do not constitute a general appearance.

The lesson to be learned: if you plan to challenge personal jurisdiction, those words should be the first ones out of your mouth. And they should be on the record.

ANDERS AND THE SECOND MILE


In the interest of J.L.B., a child
Dallas Court of Appeals, No. 05-20-00526-CV (October 15, 2020)
Justices Whitehill (Opinion, linked here), Osborne, and Carlyle

In Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), the United States Supreme Court established a procedure for how appointed counsel for a criminal defendant must deal with the client’s request to pursue an appeal when that lawyer knows that any appeal would be frivolous. In short, that lawyer must file the appeal as requested, but prepare and file a brief that examines the law and the record in detail and explains why there are no arguable grounds for reversal. Anyone who has ever written an “Anders brief” knows it is a soul-crushing experience, contrary to every advocate’s basic instincts. Because the client understandably feels betrayed by the lawyer’s performance of his duty to the legal system under Anders, the brief is accompanied by a motion to withdraw as counsel for that client. And in the federal criminal system, when the appeals court agrees with the lawyer’s analysis and decides the appeal lacks merit, that motion to withdraw is routinely granted. But there’s a twist in Texas.

Texas courts have extended Anders to parental termination cases. See In re D.D., 279 S.W.3d 849, 850 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied). In J.L.B., the counsel appointed for a mother in a parential rights dispute duly followed the Anders procedure and filed a brief that “professionally evaluate[d] the record and demonstrate[d] that there are no arguable grounds for reversal.” The appeals court affirmed the ruling the mother had sought to overturn. But it denied the attorney’s motion to withdraw. The Court reminded us that here, an appointed counsel’s obligations extend through a potential petition for review to the Supreme Court of Texas. “If Mother, after consulting with counsel, desires to file a petition for review, counsel must file a petition for review that satisfies Anders.” Counsel must walk the second mile. “[T]he appeal’s frivolousness … is not sufficient good cause for withdrawing” before that task is done.

DOMINANT JURISDICTION: TRANSFER AFFECTS WHICH CASE IS “FIRST FILED”


In re Equinor Texas Onshore Properties f/k/a Statoil Texas Onshore Properties LLC
Dallas Court of Appeals, No. 05-20-00578-CV (October 7, 2020)
Chief Justice Burns (Opinion, linked here), and Justices Partida-Kipness and Reichek
Against a convoluted factual and procedural background, the Dallas Court of Appeals announced a comparatively simple rule: When determining which of two interrelated cases is “first filed” for purposes of “dominant jurisdiction,” if one of those cases has been transferred to a different court and county, it is the date on which that case arrived in the transferee court that governs, not the date when that case was originally filed in the transferor court.

A bank, as trustee, held certain oil and gas interests in LaSalle County, Texas—an enclave of about 7,000 souls roughly halfway between San Antonio and Laredo. Equinor and Repsol together acquired lease rights to some of those interests. When a dispute arose about royalty payments, the bank filed two separate lawsuits in LaSalle County, one against Equinor and one against Repsol—even though it would later contend they were jointly and severally liable for the alleged shortfall. The case against Repsol was assigned a lower docket number than the Equinor lawsuit, even though the file-mark on the petition indicated it was filed three days later. Equinor accepted venue in LaSalle County. But Repsol challenged venue, and the case against it was transferred by agreement to Dallas County. After the transfer, the bank added Equinor to the Dallas case that had originally been filed only against Repsol. Equinor objected, moved to transfer venue, and filed a plea in abatement, asserting dominant jurisdiction lay with the LaSalle County district court in the case in which the bank had sued Equinor originally.

With respect to interrelated lawsuits, the “court in which suit is first filed acquires dominant jurisdiction to the exclusion of other coordinate courts.” In re JB Hunt Transp., Inc., 492 S.W.3d 287, 294 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding). The parties did not dispute that the two suits here were interrelated. But there was considerable disagreement about which was “first filed,” given the confusion arising from the discrepancy between the file stamps and the sequence of case numbers assigned to the original Equinor and Repsol lawsuits in LaSalle County. The Dallas Court of Appeals, however, swept that confusion aside, holding that the “LaSalle County court acquired jurisdiction over the Equinor Lawsuit long before the Dallas County court acquired jurisdiction over the Repsol Lawsuit” to which Equinor was later added, and that the date and timing of the transferred Repsol lawsuit did “not relate back” to its original filing in LaSalle County. Dominant jurisdiction, therefore, lay with the LaSalle County district court in the original Equinor lawsuit. So Equinor was entitled to have the Dallas County case against it abated.

NO CONTINUANCE TO AVOID BENCH TRIAL BY VIDEO

In re John Sakyi
Dallas Court of Appeals, No. 05-20-00574-CV (August 20, 2020)
Chief Justice Burns and Justices Pedersen, III and Reichek (Opinion available here)
The fact that you don’t want to conduct your bench trial via videoconference in order to maintain social distancing is not a valid basis for continuance. In this mandamus proceeding arising out of a divorce case, the Dallas Court of Appeals found that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the husband’s motion for continuance based on his need to conduct additional discovery into whether his purported wife was still married to another man at the time of their wedding. But the Court rejected the husband’s other basis for requesting a continuance—that he did not consent to participate in the bench trial via videoconference. He also expressed concern about his counsel’s inability to talk to him without violating social distancing recommendations.

The Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling the husband’s objection to trial via videoconference. In its emergency orders, the Supreme Court of Texas expressly granted trial courts the discretion, “subject only to constitutional limitations” and “without a participant’s consent,” to require that all participants in hearings, depositions, “or other proceeding[s] of any kind” participate remotely, “such as by teleconferencing, videoconferencing, or other means.” Although the emergency orders do not specify bench trials, the Court held they would fall under the category of “other proceeding[s] of any kind.” The husband did not claim a bench trial by videoconference would violate any of his constitutional rights, so the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring him to participate in this manner.

JURY SELECTION IN FATAL-ACCIDENT CASE SPARKS BATSON BATTLE IN APPELLATE COURT

United Rentals North America, Inc. v. Evans
Dallas Court of Appeals, No. 05-18-00665-CV (August 18, 2020)
Justices Pederson III, Reichek (Opinion linked here), and Carlyle Dissents from Denial of En Banc Reconsideration by Justices Evans (Dissent linked here) and Schenck (Dissent linked here)
A Dallas Court of Appeals panel unanimously affirmed a judgment for plaintiffs in a wrongful death case, overruling the defendant’s objections to the trial court’s Batson rulings in jury selection. The case apparently sparked internal controversy in the 12-member Court. On the same day the panel opinion issued, two Justices who were not on the panel filed dissents to the denial of en banc reconsideration. The competing opinions provide roadmaps for applying the Batson guidelines to civil lawsuits.

A big rig hauling an oversized “boom lift” for United Rentals struck a bridge in a highway construction zone, which caused a bridge beam to collapse on a pickup truck, killing the driver. The decedent’s mother and son brought a wrongful-death and survival suit against several defendants. Before judgment, all defendants except United Rentals settled or were dismissed. During voir dire, the court granted two of Plaintiffs’ Batson challenges to United Rentals’ use of preemptory strikes, and denied United Rentals’ competing Batson challenges. The jury found for Plaintiffs and the court entered judgment awarding $2.79 million in damages. United Rentals appealed.

Before addressing the Batson issues, the appeals court overruled United Rentals’ substantive issues, including its arguments that the negligence verdict was error because United Rentals, “as a shipper, had no duty to see that the carrier … shipped its cargo safely,” and there was insufficient evidence to support the damages awarded for the decedent’s “conscious pain and mental anguish” in the few seconds between the collision and his death. Those holdings consume over 35 pages of the panel’s opinion, and Justice Schenck’s dissent to the denial of en banc review urges the Texas Supreme Court “to establish the proper review standard to govern pain and suffering awards.” These issues could be the subject of a separate blog post.

Turning to the Batson dispute, the Court summarized United Rentals’ argument: The “trial court erred in granting appellees’ challenges to two of United Rentals’ peremptory strikes of black women while denying United Rentals’ challenges to appellees’ use of strikes on men, four of whom were white.”

The Batson rules were originally promulgated to prevent criminal prosecutors from using peremptory strikes to exclude jurors solely because they were of the same race as the defendant. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). Batson has since been extended to civil trials and to other “suspect” grounds for striking potential jurors. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 618-28 (1991); Goode v. Shoukfeh, 943 S.W.2d 441, 444-45 (Tex. 1997).

Applying Batson involves a three-step process similar to the test for employment discrimination. First, the party objecting to a preemptory strike must establish a prima facie case it “was used to exclude a venire member on the basis of race or gender.” Second, the proponent of the strike must articulate “a race- or gender-neutral reason for the strike.” Finally, the party challenging the strike has an opportunity to rebut the explanation and show it is a pretext for unlawful discrimination. The standard for evaluating a strike under Batson is “whether race [or gender] was a motivating factor in counsel’s exercise of the strike.” The trial court’s rulings, often based on credibility assessments, are subject to review for abuse of discretion.

Here, Plaintiffs objected to United Rentals’ use of all five of its peremptory strikes on black women, and United Rentals objected to Plaintiffs’ striking four white men and one Hispanic man. The judge granted two of Plaintiffs’ Batson challenges, and denied all of United Rentals’ challenges. After reviewing the voir dire colloquies and arguments of counsel, the Court of Appeals held the judge did not abuse her discretion in finding that race was a motivating factor for United Rentals striking one of the two jurors. Central to the Court’s holding was that the record did not support counsel’s stated reason for striking the prospective juror. The second juror placed on the jury over United Rentals’ objection did not join in the jury’s adverse verdict, so the appeals court held any error in allowing her to serve was harmless.

As for the trial court’s denial of United Rentals’ challenge to Plaintiffs’ strikes, the appeals court rejected the argument that Plaintiffs’ counsel admitted unlawful discrimination by telling the judge, “We know from our focus groups that the African-American female is the most favorable juror for this case for whatever reason.” The court concluded counsel made this statement in the context of “explaining why they believed United Rentals’ strike of [a] particular black panelist was pretextual,” and did not evidence Plaintiffs’ “intent to seat a jury without whites or males.” And although the Court acknowledged the gender and racial “disparities suggest something more than happenstance,” they did not alone “establish that appellees’ explanations of the strikes were pretextual.” The Court then conducted a “comparative analysis” of the record relevant to each of Plaintiffs’ strikes and concluded the judge did not abuse her discretion in denying the challenges. The Court explained, “Disparate treatment is not shown where a party strikes a juror because of multiple characteristics and does not strike jurors of other races or genders who share one or more of those characteristics.”

The online docket does not reveal a request for en banc review or a vote on such a request. Nevertheless, two dissents from a denial of en banc consideration, released at the same time as the panel opinion, indicate a vote did occur. See Tex. R. App. P. 41.2(c). Justice Evans, joined by Justices Whitehill and Schenck, submitted a lengthy opinion supporting reversal and remand for a new trial on the grounds that “a race- and gender-based goal—the substantial motivation—in selecting the jury was plainly and openly stated, and 100% of the peremptory challenges were perfectly consistent with that goal.” The dissent characterized the statement of Plaintiffs’ counsel that “the African-American female is the most favorable juror for this case” as rare “direct evidence of discriminatory intent,” which, combined with evidence of the plan’s execution, “may well stand for itself and obviate any need of further analysis.” Nevertheless, the dissent reviewed in detail the record relevant to each of the jurors excluded by Plaintiffs. In addition to Plaintiffs’ stated “discriminatory goal,” the dissent found “misstatements of the record” and “pretextual reasons about which [Plaintiffs] did not ask questions.” According to the dissent, “the only possible conclusion” is that Plaintiffs “intended to strike non-black men from the jury in violation of Batson” and its progeny.

NURSING HOME POLICIES AND PROCEDURES NOT SUBJECT TO CHAPTER 74 DISCOVERY STAY

In re: Kenneth Smith
Dallas Court of Appeals, No. 05-20-00497-CV (August 12, 2020)
Justices Burns, Pedersen (Opinion available here), and Carlyle
Kenneth Smith sued the nursing home where his wife had stayed during the months before her death, alleging the facility failed to provide adequate care and supervision to prevent his wife from suffering several falls during her stay. Under Chapter 74, discovery in a health care liability claim is stayed until an expert report has been filed, except for “information, including medical or hospital records or other documents or tangible things, related to the patient’s health care.” Relying on that discovery stay, the trial court denied a motion to compel that sought to require the nursing home to produce several policies and procedures that are statutorily required to be kept and made available to patients and their families.

The Dallas Court of Appeals conditionally granted mandamus, concluding the trial court abused its discretion in denying discovery of the requested policies. Texas courts have reached different conclusions about whether policies and procedures fall within the exception to the Chapter 74 discovery stay. But the Court noted in this case that the requested policies (1) were required by statute to be publicly available; and (2) were “related to the patient’s health care.” “As there is no dispute that relator’s claims—alleging inadequate supervision and services to meet a nursing home resident’s health care needs and protect her from harm—are health care claims, it logically follows that “training and staffing policies” are “integral components of [the nursing home’s] rendition of health care services.” In particular, the requested policies and procedures were “relevant to assessing the standard of care that should have been given to Mrs. Smith,” and Mr. Smith and his expert should have had access to those documents before having to produce their expert report.

The Court also found that Mr. Smith had no adequate remedy by appeal because, without the requested documents, he would be severely hampered in his ability to file an adequate expert report, which could result in his claims being dismissed. Although he would be able to appeal from the grant of a motion to dismiss, the Court would be limited in its ability to cure the error because it would only be able to remand for the trial court to consider whether to grant a thirty-day extension to file an adequate report. The Court therefore vacated the trial court’s order and directed it to issue an order granting discovery of the requested documents.

NO PERMISSIVE APPEAL WHERE CONTROLLING ISSUES WERE NOT DECIDED BY THE TRIAL COURT

Home State County Mutual Insurance Co. d/b/a Safeco v. Taiwo
Dallas Court of Appeals, No. 05-20-00596-CV (August 12, 2020)
Chief Justice Burns (Opinion, linked here), and Justices Whitehill and Nowell
In a very short opinion, the Dallas Court of appeals rejected an insurer’s petition for a permissive interlocutory appeal. The briefs explain Taiwo was injured in a traffic accident allegedly caused by another driver. He settled for the limits of that driver’s insurance policy, an amount less than his purported damages. Taiwo then sued his own insurer, Safeco, relying on his UM/UIM coverage. Safeco sought summary judgment, arguing Taiwo was required to obtain a judicial determination that he was legally entitled to recover from an uninsured or underinsured motorist before proceeding against his own insurer—something he had not done. See Brainard v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co, 216 S.W.3d 809 (Tex. 2006). Taiwo, however, moved to postpone the summary judgment hearing in order to take discovery, and the trial court granted that motion.

Safeco sought permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal of that ruling under Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 51.014(d) & (f). It argued the trial court’s decision “turned on” three “controlling questions of law”—i.e., (1) whether an insured must obtain a judicial determination that he was legally entitled to recover from an uninsured or underinsured motorist before he can proceed against his own insurer on UM/UIM issues, and (2) whether a court can defer dismissal or abatement based on that ground and (3) allow discovery to proceed, without first resolving that threshold issue. The trial court granted permission for the appeal, pursuant to § 51.014(d). But the Dallas Court of Appeals rejected Safeco’s petition and denied the appeal under § 51.014(f).

The appeals court held that “to invoke this court’s permissive appeal jurisdiction, the trial court must make a substantive ruling on the controlling legal issues presented in the petition for permissive appeal.” It found the trial court had not done that here. The record reveals that although the trial court’s order refers to “the controlling questions of law decided by this order,” it actually contains no such decisions on those questions—at least no express decisions. The proposed form of order tendered by Safeco included such rulings, but the trial court manually lined through those passages and inserted the more generic statement that its order was predicated on “the argument and authority in the motion, the response, and papers on file.” This, the appeals court apparently concluded, did not constitute the “substantive ruling on the controlling legal issues” necessary to support a permissive appeal.

DALLAS COURT OF APPEALS CONTINUES TO REIN IN THE TCPA’S APPLICABILITY TO BUSINESS DISPUTES

Palladium Metal Recycling, LLC v. 5G Metals, Inc.
Dallas Court of Appeals, No. 05-19-00482-CV (July 28, 2020)
Justices Bridges, Molberg (Opinion, linked here), and Partida-Kipness

Woods Capital Enterprises, LLC v. DXC Technology Services, LLC
Dallas Court of Appeals, No. 05-19-00380-CV (July 29, 2020)
Justices Pedersen, III, Reichek (Opinion, linked here), and Carlyle (Concurrence, linked here)
In a pair of opinions this week, the Dallas Court of Appeals continued its trend of holding the TCPA inapplicable to many private business disputes. Palladium arose from a disagreement regarding a joint venture to acquire and re-sell scrap metals. Woods Capital grew out of a failed agreement for the sale of a large tract of commercial real estate. In each case, the Court of Appeals held the TCPA’s free-speech and right-of-association protections did not apply to communications and conduct focused on the business dealings of the parties involved. In each case, the Court referenced the stated purpose of the TCPA to protect “public participation” and drew upon the Supreme Court’s decision last year in Creative Oil & Gas, LLC v. Lona Hills Ranch, LLC, 591 S.W.3d 127 (Tex. 2019). A sampling of the Court’s observations in the two cases:

• “The TCPA’s purpose of curbing strategic lawsuits against public participation is not furthered by a construction finding a right of association based simply on communications between parties with a shared interest in a private business transaction.”

• Rejecting a TCPA free-speech attack, the Court held the allegations targeted by the motion “lack any communications regarding matters of public concern as opposed to private pecuniary interests and thus do not implicate the TCPA’s protection of Palladium’s exercise of the right of free speech.”

• Acknowledging that the TCPA defines “matters of public concern”—the linchpin of TCPA free-speech protection—to include “issues related to health or safety; environmental, economic, or community well-being; the government; a public official or public figure; or a good, product, or service in the marketplace,” the Court cautioned that “not every communication related to one of the broad categories set out in [the statute] always regards a matter of public concern.” Because the record was “devoid of allegations or evidence that the dispute had any relevance beyond the pecuniary interests of the private parties involved,” the Court refused to find TCPA free-speech protections applicable.

• “This Court has consistently held that to constitute an exercise of the right of association under the TCPA, the nature of the communication between individuals who join together must involve public or citizen participation.”

Beyond its pronouncements on the applicability of the TCPA to business disputes, each decision also included an additional holding to which litigants should be alert. In Palladium, the Court held the TCPA movant had waived its objections to the non-movants’ evidence because it had not obtained a ruling on those objections and had not objected to the trial court’s failure to rule.

In Woods Capital, the Court ruled that the movant had “forfeited its [TCPA] motion” by failing to schedule a hearing within the period prescribed by statute. The TCPA allows the parties to delay a hearing by agreement for up to 90 days after service of the motion. A hearing may be delayed up to 120 days only if the court, upon a showing of good cause, “allows” limited discovery related to the TCPA motion. Reaffirming its ruling earlier this summer in Walker v. Pegasus Eventing, LLC, the Court held that the parties’ agreement to conduct discovery and the court’s acquiescence does not equate to “allowance” by the court that triggers the extra 30 days. Consequently, failure to schedule a hearing within the 90-day period, without court “allowance” of discovery, resulted in forfeiture of the motion.

Print