Estate of Tacke
Fort Worth Court of Appeals, No. 02-14-00400-CV (April 2, 2015)
Chief Justice Livingston and Justices Gardner (Opinion) and Walker
Ordinarily an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment that disposes of all issues and all parties in a case. But there are a few exceptions to this rule. Most practitioners are familiar with § 51.014 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which authorizes appeals from a variety of interlocutory orders. Other exceptions are scattered throughout the Texas statutes, and in Tacke the Fort Worth Court of Appeals addressed one—§ 32.001(c) of the Estates Code, which provides for appeal from a “final order” of a probate court. As the Fort Worth Court explained, “[t]he need to review controlling, intermediate decisions before an error can harm later phases of the proceeding justifies modifying the one final judgment rule with respect to probate cases.” So, when is a probate court’s order “final” and appealable under this provision?
In Tacke, a father’s will directed that his residuary estate be divided among his children, 35% to Sandra, 30% to David, and 35% to Roger. The will also directed, however, that certain specific property was to go to each child, with the value of that property counted toward their percentage shares. Roger contended the executors assigned too high a value to certain ranch property left specifically to him, thereby depriving him of his full 35% and leading to overdistributions to his siblings. Roger sought to remove the co-executors; they responded with a petition for declaratory relief confirming their valuation of the disputed ranch property and discharging them from liability regarding their administration of the estate. The executors and Roger filed cross-motions for summary judgment regarding the value of the ranch. The probate court granted Roger’s motion and denied the motion filed by the executors. When the executors appealed, the Fort Worth Court dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Under the Texas Supreme Court’s 1995 decision in Crowson v. Wakeham, for a probate court’s order to be “final” and appealable under § 32.001(c), either (1) there must be a statute expressly declaring the particular phase of the probate proceedings to be final and appealable, or (2) the order must dispose of all issues in the phase in which it was brought. Here, although the probate court’s summary judgment order may have been “final” in a practical sense—establishing the ranch property’s value for remaining probate and estate proceedings—it did not dispose of Roger’s request for the executors’ removal or the executors’ motion for discharge. So, it was not a “final order” appealable under § 32.001(c).
