Another Permissive Appeal Bites the Dust

FCA US LLC v. Adient US, LLC

Dallas Court of Appeals, No. 05-25-00836-CV (July 28, 2025)

Justices Smith, Clinton (Opinion, linked here), and Barbare

 

Ken Carroll

Petitions to pursue permissive appeals continue to fare poorly, with the Courts of Appeals insisting on strict compliance with TRCP 168 and TCPRC § 51.014(d) and denying petitions that don’t dot every “i” and cross every “t.” 

Adient secured a summary judgment dismissing FCA’s claims against it. The trial court denied FCA’s motion to reconsider, but granted its request for leave to pursue a permissive interlocutory appeal pursuant to TRCP 168 and TCPRC § 51.014(d). The court found (1) that its “rulings involve a controlling question of law on which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion”—specifically, the scope and application of “the component-part-supplier doctrine, announced in Bostrom Seating, Inc. v. Crane Carrier Co., 140 S.W.3d 681 (Tex. 2004)” and an exception to that doctrine—and also (2) that an interlocutory appeal of the issue “may materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation”—i.e., it addressed both prongs of Rule 168 and § 51.014(d), or so it thought.

The Dallas Court of Appeals rejected FCA’s petition to pursue its permissive interlocutory appeal. The Court explained that it “strictly construe[s] applications for permissive appeals because statutes allowing for interlocutory appeals are an exception to the general rule that only final judgments are appealable.” Here, the Court said, the trial court’s order did not comply with Rule 168’s requirement that it “state why an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” It just broadly asserted that an interlocutory appeal might advance ultimate termination of the litigation, without saying why that was so.  The appeals court held that, “The order’s rote recitation of possible material advancement—without an explanation of ‘why’ immediate appeal may advance ultimate termination of the litigation—fails to satisfy an express requirement of Rule 168.” The appeals court rejected FCA’s argument that the “why” could be inferred from the trial court’s order and its context—i.e., that absent an interlocutory appeal, the purported “summary-judgment error could result in an unnecessary trial without Adient as a party.” Strict compliance with Rule 168 requires that the trial court’s order “state” why an interlocutory appeal may materially advance termination of the litigation. 

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