Rule 91a Dismissal Based on Affirmative Defense of Derived Judicial Immunity

Sposito v. Rollins-Threats

Dallas Court of Appeals, No. 05-23-00597-CV (July 10, 2024)

Justices Justices Partida-Kipness (Opinion, linked here), Pedersen III, and Carlyle

In a suit affecting the parent-child relationship (SAPCR), the family court appointed Dr. Rollins-Threats as a “parenting facilitator.” Displeased with the SAPCR process and outcome, Sposito sued Rollins-Threats for malpractice, “child endangerment,” and slander, alleging she had “violated state and federal laws,” “told multiple lies,” and “violated [Sposito’s] rights,” in the course of the SAPCR proceedings. Rollins-Threats responded with a motion to dismiss under Rule 91a, asserting the affirmative defense of “derived judicial immunity” in her role as a court-appointed parenting facilitator. The trial court granted that motion, dismissing Sposito’s case, and the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed.

Under Rule 91a, a court may dismiss a cause of action that has no basis in law or fact. A claim has no basis in law “where the allegations in the plaintiff’s own pleading establish a complete legal bar to the plaintiff’s claims by affirmatively negating entitlement to the relief requested.” That can include dismissal on the basis of an affirmative defense, if (1) the plaintiff’s own pleading establishes that affirmative defense, and (2) the affirmative defense has been pleaded by the defendant and is properly before the court.

Here, as noted, Rollins-Threats had pleaded the affirmative defense of derived judicial immunity. “When entitled to the protection of derived judicial immunity, an officer of the court receives the same immunity as a judge acting in his or her official judicial capacity—absolute immunity from liability for judicial acts performed within the scope of [his or her] jurisdiction.” Texas courts apply a “functional approach” to determine if a party is entitled to such immunity, focusing on whether the conduct of the person appointed by the court is like that of the delegating or appointing judge. “If the tasks necessitate the exercise of discretion, judicial immunity will apply.”

The Court of Appeals found no cases addressing whether a court-appointed parenting facilitator is entitled to derived judicial immunity. But after examining Dr. Rollins-Threats’s assigned duties, the Court held that she met the standard for immunity, that Sposito’s claims all rested on Rollins-Threats’s performance of her duties as a court-appointed parenting facilitator, and therefore that the trial court properly dismissed Sposito’s claims under Rule 91a.