Divided En Banc Court Holds Arbitrators Must Decide Arbitrability When Arbitration Agreement Incorporates AAA Rules

Prestonwood Tradition, LP v. Jennings 

Dallas Court of Appeals, No. 05-20-00380-CV (August 5, 2022) 

En Banc (Pedersen majority opinion available here; Partida-Kipness dissent available 

here; Schenck concurrence available here)

 Robert Fountain 

 

A divided en banc Dallas Court of Appeals has held that arbitrators—not a court—must decide arbitrability issues when an arbitration agreement incorporates the AAA’s Commercial Arbitration Rules—even when the AAA administratively declines to decide the issue without direction from a court. 

      

Several residents of The Tradition-Prestonwood senior living community died in 2016. Representatives of the residents’ estates raised wrongful death and survivorship claims against the owners of the facility. The owners commenced AAA arbitrations based on agreements in their leases with the deceased residents. These arbitration agreements stated, “any claims, controversies, or disputes arising between us and in any way related to or arising out of the relationship created by this Agreement shall be resolved exclusively by binding arbitration” using the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association. The decedents’ representatives objected to arbitration and filed suit in county court, where they requested a declaratory judgment that their claims were not subject to arbitration. They moved to stay arbitration. After the AAA—itself, not through a duly empaneled arbitrator or arbitrators—made an “administrative determination” not to proceed without the parties’ mutual agreement or until the court decided the issue of arbitrability, the trial court granted the decedents’ representatives’ motion to stay arbitration and denied the owners’ request to abate the lawsuits. The owners filed interlocutory appeals and the court of appeals eventually granted en banc review. 

         

          In a 7-6 split, the en banc Dallas Court held the trial court abused its discretion when it decided arbitrability issues that had been delegated to the arbitrator. Trial courts generally determine arbitrability unless the parties “clearly and unmistakably” delegate arbitrability to the arbitrator. The Court explained that the arbitration agreements in this case had incorporated the AAA’s Commercial Rules, one of which provides that the arbitrator has the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections to the arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim. Coupled with the broad scope of the arbitration agreements—which encompassed “any claims, controversies, or disputes arising between us and in any way related to or arising out of the relationship created by this Agreement”—the agreements evidenced a clear and unmistakable intent that arbitrability would be determined by the arbitrator. 

     The dissent acknowledged that “under ordinary circumstances” incorporation of the AAA’s commercial rules means the arbitrator is to decide arbitrability. However, the dissent argued, the circumstances of this case were not “ordinary” because (1) the AAA had declined to decide arbitrability, deferring to the trial court, and (2) the decedents’ representatives were not signatories to the arbitration agreements. The dissent, therefore, would have gone on to review the substance of the arbitrability issue and to find that the disputes were not subject to arbitration under the Texas Arbitration Act. 

          The majority responded that neither of the distinctions identified by the dissent justified creating an exemption from the general rule. The AAA was bound to decide arbitrability based on the parties’ agreements, and the trial court should not have acquiesced to the AAA’s “administrative decision” punting arbitrability to the trial court in violation of the parties’ contracts. The fact the dispute involved non-signatories was irrelevant because the arbitration agreements specifically bound “all persons whose claim is derived through or on behalf of [decedent], including that of the [decedent’s] family, heirs, guardian, executor, administrator and assigns.” The representatives’ claims for wrongful death and survivorship were “derived through or on behalf of” the deceased residents. Because they stood in the decedents’ legal shoes, the representatives were bound by the decedents’ arbitration agreements. The en banc Court therefore reversed the stay of arbitration and remanded with instructions to order the parties to arbitration. 

        NOTE: The “general rule” at issue here—whether incorporation of the AAA rules “constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence of the parties’ intent to delegate the issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator”—is set to be addressed by the Supreme Court of Texas early in its upcoming term. The Court has granted review and is scheduled to hear argument on the issue next month in MP Gulf of Mex., LLC v. Total E&P USA, Inc., Case No. 21-0028.

Vice Principals, the Fifth Amendment, and Negative Inferences

 Lurks v. Designer Draperies and Floors, Inc. 

 Dallas Court of Appeals, No. 05-21-00908-CV (July 27, 2022)

 Justices Schenck (Opinion, linked here), Osborne, and Smith 

 Ken Carroll 

While Lurks was attending to a disabled car in the right lane of the I-20 frontage road, Heitzman struck that car from behind, seriously injuring Lurks. Heitzman failed a field sobriety test at the scene, was arrested, and then tested well above the legal limit for blood alcohol. Lurks sued Designer Draperies and Floors (“DDF”), arguing that when Heitzman became intoxicated and decided to drive anyway, he was acting as a “vice principal” of DDF. “In other words, Lurks urge[d] that DDF step[ped] into the shoes of Heitzmann and is, therefore, directly liable for Lurks’s injuries.” 

The trial court, however, granted summary judgment to DDF, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. There was some evidence—and potential inferences from Heitzman’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights in his deposition—that Heitzman “consum[ed] alcoholic beverages at DDF’s workplace, that he was drinking with employees of DDF, and, perhaps, that someone encouraged him to drive.” But none of this was sufficient even to raise a fact question that Heitzman’s conduct was “referable to DDF’s business,” which the Court ruled was essential to a “vice principal” theory of liability against DDF. 

Along the way, the Court assumed, without deciding, that “a jury would be allowed to draw negative inferences regarding Heitzmann’s assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege.” Because of the Court’s determination that Lurks had failed to adduce any evidence that Heitzman’s alleged misconduct was “referable to DDF’s business,” indulging this assumption didn’t matter. But it wades into murky waters. Heitzman was not a party to the lawsuit, even though his actions were a focus of the case. The question whether a witness’s invoking the Fifth will give rise to a negative inference against someone else is difficult, to say the least. The answer may differ depending on whether the issue arises in Texas or federal court, and whether the witness can be said to have been acting for the other party such that his or her invocation of privilege can be attributed to that party as his words would have been under Tex. R. Evid. 801(e)(2)(D). Compare, e.g., P.C. as next friend of C.C. v. E.C., 594 S.W.3d 459, 461-65 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2019, no pet.), with Wil-Roye Inv. Co. II v. Washington Mut. Bank, FA, 142 S.W.3d 393, 403-07 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.).

Fifth Court: Twenty-Plus Years of Precedent on Bankruptcy Trustee’s “Exclusive Standing” Implicitly Overruled by SCOTX

Moser v. Dillon Investments, LLC 

Dallas Court of Appeals, No. 05-21-00204-CV (August 2, 2022) 

Justices Myers (Opinion, linked here), Osborne, and Nowell 

 Brent M. Rubin 

Mason claimed that, while staying at a hotel on June 30, 2017, she was taking a shower and the bathtub floor shifted, causing her to fall and hit her head. On June 13, 2019, Mason sued the hotel in state court for negligence. But in April 2018, Mason had filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy without listing her potential claim against the hotel on her schedule of assets. By the end of 2018, Mason had received a discharge and the bankruptcy case had terminated.

The hotel initially sought summary judgment, alleging Mason lacked standing to assert the claim and that she was judicially estopped from bringing the claim. The hotel argued that because Mason had not disclosed the claim in her bankruptcy schedules, the claim remained with the bankruptcy estate and was not returned to her upon the bankruptcy’s termination. Mason then filed a motion in bankruptcy court to reopen the bankruptcy to amend her schedules to add the negligence claim, which the bankruptcy court granted. 

In January 2021, Moser, the bankruptcy trustee, filed an amended petition in the state court case on behalf of Mason’s bankruptcy estate, alleging the same negligence claim against the hotel. The hotel moved for summary judgment, arguing the amended petition was filed after the two-year statute of limitations had run. The trial court granted the motion. 

Moser’s appeal centered on the relation-back doctrine. Section 16.068 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides that when a party initially brings a timely claim, “a subsequent amendment or supplement to the pleading that changes the facts or grounds of liability or defense is not subject to a plea of limitation unless the amendment or supplement is wholly based on a new, distinct, or different transaction or occurrence.” But the relation-back doctrine does not apply to an amended petition when the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the original petition. 

Mason first brought her negligence claim within the two-year statute of limitations, and Moser’s amended petition on behalf of the bankruptcy estate alleged the same facts as Mason’s original petition. So, to determine whether the relation-back doctrine applied, the court of appeals considered whether the trial court had jurisdiction when Mason first sued. 

The court of appeals explained that for the trial court to lack jurisdiction based on a lack of standing, Mason had to lack “constitutional” standing. The Court noted that courts have, at times, blurred the distinction between standing and capacity—a critical if sometimes confusing distinction, because standing is jurisdictional, while capacity is not. In 1999, the Texas Supreme Court held in Douglas v. Delp that a bankruptcy trustee had “exclusive standing” to bring claims on behalf of the estate, quoting a 1994 Fifth Circuit decision that did not expressly address the question of constitutional standing. After an extensive analysis of later Fifth Circuit cases on a bankruptcy trustee’s authority to bring claims on behalf of the estate as well as later Texas Supreme Court decisions addressing the distinction between standing and capacity, the court of appeals concluded the Texas Supreme Court had implicitly overruled Douglas and the various intermediate appellate decisions—including those of the Fifth Court—that had followed it. 

 Accordingly, the Court said, Mason had standing to bring her claim in 2019; she merely lacked capacity to assert it. Therefore, the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction in 2019, Moser’s amended petition in 2021, in his capacity as bankruptcy trustee, related back to Mason’s timely 2019 petition, and the trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on the statute of limitations.

Finality Bites—Again

JMJ Development, LLC v. Ramolia

Dallas Court of Appeals, No. 05-21-01100-CV (July 27, 2022) 

Justices Myers, Molberg (Opinion, linked here), and Garcia 

Ken Carroll 

Another appeal down the drain because of confusion about whether a judgment was final. 

Ramolia sued JMJ and Barton for breach of contract. They counterclaimed. Ramolia sought and secured summary judgment on his breach-of-contract claim. Even though Ramolia had not moved for summary judgment on JMJ and Barton’s claims against him, the court’s summary judgment order was titled “Final Judgment.” And it included the “magic” finality language blessed by the Texas Supreme Court in Lehmann v. Har-Con: “All relief requested in this case and not expressly granted herein is denied. This judgment finally disposes of all parties and claims and is appealable.” JMJ and Barton timely moved for a new trial but did not file their notice of appeal until after the deadline had expired, including the time for an extension.

Faced with the prospect that the tardy notice of appeal would bar their appeal altogether, JMJ and Barton argued the judgment was not final and appealable because Ramolia’s summary judgment motion had not sought disposition of their claims against him. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). The Court of Appeals disagreed. 

A judgment is final, the Court said, “if it actually disposes, or ‘clearly and unequivocally’ states it disposes, of all claims and all parties.” The summary judgment order did that, whether it should have or not. “A judgment that grants more relief than a party is entitled to is subject to reversal”—assuming it is timely appealed—“but it is not, for that reason alone, interlocutory,” and therefore non-appealable. “If it is clear, then the order is final and appealable, even though the record does not provide an adequate basis for rendition of the judgment.” In this case, the Court held, the judgment “was clear and unequivocal, the record is irrelevant, and further analysis is prohibited.” Because JMJ and Barton didn’t file their notice of appeal on time, therefore, the Dallas Court dismissed the appeal, and JMJ and Barton are stuck with a judgment that might have been “subject to reversal,” at least in part, had they recognized that judgment was final and filed their notice on time.

Duty Not to Distract a Driver Applies Only to Others in the Vehicle?

Gamble v. Anesthesiology Associates, P.S.C.

Dallas Court of Appeals, No. 05-20-01024-CV (July 21, 2022)

Justices Schenck, Osborne, and Smith (Opinion, linked here)

Ken Carroll

While driving on I-35 with her cruise control set to 80, Blain struck and killed two people who had stopped on the side of the highway to change a tire. At the time, Blain was engaged in a 20-minute hands-free cellphone conversation with Richter, a friend who had called Blain from Kentucky to tell her he was retiring. Blain and her employer—she was on a business trip at the time—settled. But Richter and his employer secured summary judgment against the various theories of direct, vicarious, and joint liability asserted against them. The Court of Appeals ultimately reversed and remanded on a joint-enterprise theory of liability—not on the merits, but because Richter and his employer had not moved for summary judgment on that particular issue. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). But it was the Court’s ruling on another ground that stands out.

Plaintiffs claimed Richter was negligent because he distracted Blain while he knew she was driving. But the appeals court agreed with Richter that he “had no duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid distracting Blain once he realized she was driving.” The Court acknowledged a “recognized legal duty that a person must exercise reasonable care to avoid distracting a driver while [that driver is] operating a vehicle.” But it determined that duty applies only to passengers in the vehicle, or perhaps to others in “close proximity” like those in an adjacent vehicle. “A remote cellphone caller” like Richter, the Court held, “owes no duty to the general public to control the conduct of the call recipient as a matter of law.” The appeals court therefore affirmed summary judgment on that score.

One has to wonder how far this principle extends. What if the caller asked the driver to “FaceTime” or to “Zoom” or engage in other conduct that the caller knew or reasonably should know would have the driver focus on his or her phone instead of the road? What if, instead of a call, the defendant had engaged the driver in a text or instant-message exchange, or had sent a photo or a video with the message, “You gotta see this!”—all while knowing the recipient was driving? None of these situations were present in Gamble, of course. But it’s hard to see why a “remote cellphone user” who contacts someone, knowing that other person is driving (as Richter did here), should owe any less “duty to the general public” not to distract the driver than a backseat passenger who similarly asks the driver to look at a text, photo, video or otherwise knowingly draws the driver’s attention away from the road.

Refresher: To Get Judgment on a Rule 11 Agreement, Plead Breach of Contract

Patel v. Gonzalez Hotels, LLC

Dallas Court of Appeals, No. 05-20-01020-CV (July 7, 2022)

Justices Partida-Kipness (Opinion, linked here), Reichek, and Goldstein

Ken Carroll

A little reminder is welcome and helpful every now and then—although it’s often less fun for the parties who are being reminded.

Mahesh Patel sued Mehulkumar Patel, Chirag Patel, and Jayson Patel for breach of fiduciary duty, theft, and other claims relating to Gonzalez Hotels, LLC, of which they were all co-owners. After a mediation, the parties entered into a Rule 11 agreement in which Mehulkumar, Chirag, and Jayson “consented to the entry of an agreed judgment making them liable for half of Mahesh’s past and future contributions to the company.” Mahesh promptly filed a motion to enforce that agreement. But Mehulkumar, Chirag, and Jayson withdrew their consent before the trial court could act on that motion. Mahesh then filed a motion for summary judgment, “the stated goal of [which] was to obtain an agreed judgment to enforce the terms of the agreement.” The trial court granted the motion and entered judgment for Mahesh, but the Dallas Court of Appeals reversed.

“Written settlement agreements may be enforced as contracts even if one party withdraws consent before judgment is entered on the agreement,” the Court acknowledged. But, as the Texas Supreme Court explained in Ford Motor Co. v. Castillo, 279 S.W.3d 656, 663 (Tex. 2009) and elsewhere, “[w]hen consent is withdrawn [before the trial court renders judgment], the agreed judgment that was part of the settlement may not be entered. The party seeking enforcement of the settlement agreement must pursue a separate claim for breach of contract, which is subject to the normal rules of pleading and proof.” Here, Mahesh had not asserted a claim for breach of the agreement, and neither his motion to enforce nor his MSJ could substitute for that required pleading. The Court of Appeals therefore reversed and remanded to the trial court, where Mahesh no doubt will now plead breach and take a second swing at enforcing the agreement.

“Taking Responsibility” ≠ Negligence as a Matter of Law

Yedlapalli v. Jaldu

Dallas Court of Appeals, No. 05-20-00531-CV (June 28, 2022)

Justices Myers, Partida-Kipness (Opinion, linked here), and Carlyle

Brent M. Rubin

While Yedlapalli was stopped at a stop sign, Jaldu rear-ended her. Yedlapalli testified that, from her rear-view mirror, she saw Jaldu on her cell phone and that Jaldu never slowed down. Jaldu, in contrast, claimed she was at a complete stop behind Yedlapalli and reached down to get a piece of paper on the floor, which caused her foot to slip off the brake and her car to roll forward and tap Yedlapalli’s car.

Yedlapalli sued Jaldu, claiming not only damage to her car but also bodily injury. On cross-examination, Yedlapalli’s attorney asked Jaldu if she was “taking one hundred percent responsibility for the crash.” Jaldu agreed that her car hit Yedlapalli’s when her foot slipped from the brake. Jaldu also admitted she told Yedlapalli at the scene that it was her “mistake,” making her responsible for the damage to Yedlapalli’s car. But Jaldu refused to take responsibility for Yedlapalli’s purported injuries, claiming everyone was “completely fine” immediately after the accident. Jaldu also explained to the jury that it was “fishy” that Yedlapalli sued only after Yedlapalli did not pay her medical bills.

Yedlapalli moved for a directed verdict based on Jaldu’s purportedly “taking one hundred percent responsibility” for the accident. The trial court denied the request for directed verdict. The jury later answered “no” on the question whether Jaldu’s negligence caused the occurrence in question. So, the trial court entered a take-nothing judgment against Yedlapalli.

Yedlapalli appealed, challenging the denial of the motion for directed verdict and the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s finding on negligence. On the directed verdict, the court of appeals explained that acceptance of responsibility, standing alone, does not establish negligence as a matter of law. The court observed that a jury could have concluded a person of ordinary prudence, sitting at a complete stop a safe distance behind Yedlapalli, could have reached down to pick up a piece of paper, as Jaldu testified. On factual sufficiency, the court similarly explained that a rear-end collision, standing alone, does not mean a jury’s failure to find negligence is not supported by sufficient evidence. The jury could have credited Jaldu’s account and concluded that a reasonably prudent person would have acted in the same way. Or, the jury could have concluded Yedlapalli failed to meet her burden of proving negligence by a preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, the court of appeals affirmed.

SCOTx: No “Informal” Fiduciary Duty from Corporate Director to Shareholder, Regardless of Pre-Existing Relationship of Trust and Confidence

In the Matter of the Estate of Richard C. Poe

Supreme Court of Texas, No. 20-0178 (June 17, 2022)
Opinion (linked here) by Justice Huddle 

Ken Carroll

In Ritchie v. Rupe, the Texas Supreme Court held that, “[a]bsent a contractual or other legal obligation, [an] officer or director [of even a closely held corporation] has no duty to conduct the corporation’s business in a manner that suits an individual shareholder’s interests.” Instead, officers and directors owe fiduciary duties only to the corporation, itself, including “the dedication of [their] uncorrupted business judgment for the sole benefit of the corporation.” But what if a director has a relationship of trust and confidence with a shareholder that arose prior to and independent of their relationship as director and shareholder? The Supreme Court has held previously that such a relationship can give rise to an “informal fiduciary duty.” Can a director simultaneously owe both (i) conventional fiduciary duties to the corporation and (ii) an “informal” fiduciary duty to an individual shareholder, based on their pre-existing relationship? Is the latter an “other legal obligation” that is the exception to the rule as announced in Ritchie? In Poe, the Supreme Court answered, no, “a director cannot simultaneously owe these two potentially conflicting duties.”

Richard C. (“Dick”) Poe operated several car dealerships in El Paso. He consolidated control of them in PMI, a Texas corporation, which was the general partner of several limited partnerships that, in turn, owned and operated the dealerships. Poe’s son, Richard, was the sole shareholder of PMI. But Richard gave his father, Dick, an irrevocable proxy to vote those shares, and Dick was the sole director of PMI. In 2015, Dick caused PMI to issue additional shares of stock, which he bought from PMI for $3.2 million. These new shares made Dick the majority shareholder. Son Richard was not notified of these additional shares until after Dick died, shortly after the shares were issued. Richard sued Dick’s longtime accountant, his office manager, and his attorney for, among other things, conspiring with Dick to breach his fiduciary duties both to PMI and to Richard in issuing the new shares to himself. Richard contended his father’s “informal” fiduciary duty to him, arising from their longstanding relationship of trust and confidence, triggered the “other legal obligation” language of Ritchie, meaning that Dick owed fiduciary duties to Richard, individually, as well as to PMI. 

A unanimous Supreme Court of Texas disagreed, holding that 

[A]s a matter of law, a corporation’s director cannot owe an informal duty to operate or manage the corporation in the best interest of or for the benefit of an individual shareholder. A director’s fiduciary duty in the management of a corporation is solely for the benefit of the corporation. 

Because the trial court erred by allowing the jury to decide about the existence and breach of an alleged “informal” fiduciary duty from Dick to Richard, the Supreme Court reversed and (i) rendered judgment against Richard on his claims for breach of an “informal” fiduciary duty, and, (ii) because of other errors in the charge, remanded for a new trial on the remaining issues

Perfection Not Required—An Incomplete Medical Authorization May Still Toll Limitations for Healthcare Liability Claims

Gary Lew Maypole, Sr. v. Acadian Ambulance Service, Inc.

Dallas Court of Appeals, No. 05-18-00539-CV (June 10, 2022)

En Banc Opinion by Justice Molberg (linked here)

Concurrence by Justice Schenck (linked here)

Debrán O’Neil

After a motion for reconsideration en banc, the Dallas Court of Appeals issued a new opinion that allows the statute of limitations for healthcare liability claims to be tolled when the plaintiff serves a medical authorization form that substantially—even if not fully—complies with statutory requirements. Under the Texas Medical Liability Act, Chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, the statute of limitations is tolled for 75 days if the plaintiff provides defendants with a pre-suit notice of claim accompanied by an authorization for the release of the injured person’s healthcare information. The statute sets forth the form of the required authorization. As the Fifth Court of Appeals explained, the legislature’s purpose in enacting these pre-suit notice requirements is to reduce the frequency and severity of healthcare liability claims, but in a manner that does not unduly restrict a claimant’s rights. With this purpose in mind, the Court concluded that Plaintiff’s failure to list certain healthcare providers on the medical authorization form did not preclude the tolling of limitations under section 74.051(a) of the TMLA.

Gary Maypole, II suffered an anoxic brain injury while being transported by ambulance between hospitals. He later died. Gary’s father and minor children filed suit alleging medical malpractice against the critical-care transport companies. Plaintiff served Defendants with the required pre-suit notice letter and a medical records authorization, but Plaintiff did not list the names of the physicians and healthcare providers who treated Gary in the five years prior to the incident at issue. Plaintiff also did not list “none” in the section for physicians or healthcare providers excluded from the authorization. Defendants argued the medical authorization was fatally flawed, the seventy-five-day tolling period did not apply, and summary judgment should be granted because Plaintiff filed suit more than two years after the alleged malpractice. The en banc Court of Appeals disagreed for many reasons.

The Court first concluded that the statute does not require all healthcare providers to be identified for the tolling provision to apply. The Court relied heavily on the fact that Defendants made no attempt to obtain Maypole’s records from the providers listed on the authorization and were not harmed by the lack of information. It rejected several of Defendants’ technical arguments and “the notion that a ‘virtually perfect’ authorization” is required for tolling, holding that the statute was not intended “to be a game of legal ‘gotcha’” to deny access to the judicial system. The record here distinguished this case from others in which the plaintiffs did not provide authorizations with their notices. Here, the Plaintiff listed the two relevant hospitals as providers, and Defendants already had medical records in their possession that listed Maypole’s treating physician, list of prior health issues, and list of medications. The Court concluded the authorization was sufficient to toll limitations, and therefore, reversed the summary judgment and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. The Court also noted that abatement, not dismissal, is the appropriate remedy when a defendant demonstrates that an incomplete authorization hinders its ability to investigate, evaluate, and negotiate prior to the parties joining issue in a lawsuit.

Justice Schenck concurred, but would have held the statute is procedural and when notice (whether defective or not) is given, the limitations period is tolled for 75 days and fixed. Any defects in the authorization can be cured by various forms of legal relief, short of dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims on limitations grounds, based on the court’s discretionary assessment of the form’s deficiency.

Mandamus: If Not Now, When?

In re Holland

Dallas Court of Appeals, Nos. 05-22-00368-CV, -00369-CV, and -00378-CV (May 27, 2022)

Before Justices Myers, Nowell (Opinion), and Goldstein

Neil R. Burger

In three identical rulings, the Dallas Court of Appeals rejected three identical petitions for writs of mandamus as having been filed prematurely. The petitions complained that the trial court had not ruled on motions to compel discovery in three criminal cases concerning the same incarcerated individual. The convicted defendant “filed his motions on January 7, 2022, reminded the trial court that they were pending by letter dated March 7, 2022, and filed his petition[s] seeking mandamus relief on April 20, 2022.” The Court denied all three petitions, saying the Relator had not “shown he is entitled to mandamus relief after such a short period of time.”

Although it is not clear that a hearing on the motions was ever requested or set, we now have guidance that 103 days from filing a motion without getting a ruling is not long enough to warrant mandamus relief compelling the trial court to rule.