Can a Defendant Appeal When the Trial Court Orally Denies a TCPA Motion to Dismiss, But Doesn’t Sign an Order?

Eichner v. Ocwen Financial Corp.

Dallas Court of Appeals, No. 05-23-00623-CV (February 27, 2025)

Justices Goldstein, Kennedy (Opinion, linked here), and Clinton

Ken Carroll

Adding to an existing split among Texas Courts of Appeals, the Dallas Court holds that when a trial court orally denies a TCPA motion to dismiss but never signs an order to that effect, the movant can appeal, treating the motion as having been overruled by operation of law. 

Ocwen and others sued Eichner, alleging he had breached an employment separation agreement and release. Eichner moved to dismiss under the TCPA. The trial court held a timely hearing, as required by TCPA § 27.004, at which it orally denied Eichner’s motion to dismiss. But the trial court never signed an order denying the motion to dismiss. 

Eichner appealed. Ocwen moved to dismiss, arguing TCPRC § 51.014(a)(12) authorizes an interlocutory appeal only from an “order … that … denies a motion to dismiss filed under [the TCPA],” and that Eichner could not appeal because the trial court had issued no such “order” in this case. 

Despite the wording of § 51.014(a)(12), the Dallas Court of Appeals denied Ocwen’s motion to dismiss and held that Eichner could appeal. The Court noted that, while a party ordinarily may bring an interlocutory appeal only from a written order, TCPA § 27.008(a) provides an exception to that rule: “If a court does not rule on a [TCPA] motion to dismiss … in the time prescribed by [TCPA § 27.005], the motion is considered to have been denied by operation of law and the moving party may appeal.” The Dallas Court went on to hold that “by not signing a written order the trial judge did not ‘rule’ on Eichner’s motion to dismiss within the meaning of [TCPA §] 27.008(a), which means that the motion was overruled by operation of law, and that [there is] appellate jurisdiction under [TCPA §] 27.008(a).” 

In so ruling, Dallas followed the Fourteenth Court, which had explained that, “The purpose of the TCPA is to encourage and safeguard constitutional rights [and t]hat purpose would be thwarted if a trial court could insulate its decision from appellate review by refusing to sign a written order and choosing instead to orally deny a motion that should have been granted.” Simmons v. Taylor, 651 S.W.3d 499, 503 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.). The Dallas Court rejected decisions by the Houston 1st District and Beaumont Courts of Appeals, which had held to the contrary. Casillas v. M & S Concrete, No. 01-19-00145-CV, 2020 WL 2026367, at *3-4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 28, 2020, no pet.); Clark v. Paddington British Priv. Sch., Inc., No. 09-19-00056-CV, 2016 WL 4247963, at *2-3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 11, 2016, no pet.).

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