Texas Dep’t of Family and Protective Services v. Grassroots Leadership, Inc.
Supreme Court of Texas, No. 23-0192 (May 30, 2025)
Opinion by Justice Young (linked here)
Faced with deciding “whether Texas courts are constitutionally authorized to adjudicate moot cases that raise questions of considerable public importance,” the Supreme Court of Texas emphatically said, “No.”
The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services adopted a rule that authorized state licenses for two residential facilities at which the federal government detained mothers and children after their illegal entry into the United States. Grassroots, a nonprofit civil-rights organization, and several mothers detained in the licensed facilities sued to challenge that rule under the Administrative Procedure Act, seeking to prohibit the detention of children there. The trial court granted summary judgment, declaring the rule invalid, and enjoined the department from granting licenses under it. The State appealed.
The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services adopted a rule that authorized state licenses for two residential facilities at which the federal government detained mothers and children after their illegal entry into the United States. Grassroots, a nonprofit civil-rights organization, and several mothers detained in the licensed facilities sued to challenge that rule under the Administrative Procedure Act, seeking to prohibit the detention of children there. The trial court granted summary judgment, declaring the rule invalid, and enjoined the department from granting licenses under it. The State appealed.
By the time that appeal neared resolution, however, the plaintiffs were no longer detained at the facilities. The court of appeals therefore concluded that the entire case was “moot by definition.” But rather than dismissing, the appeals court invoked a “so-called ‘public-interest exception’ to mootness, under which it could reach the merits despite having no live dispute [before it] involving the parties to the litigation.” The public-interest exception, the court explained, “allows appellate review of a question of considerable public importance if that question is capable of repetition between either the same parties or other members of the public but for some reason evades appellate review.” Here, “the evidence establishe[d] that the average length of detention [at the facilities] is eleven days, a period too short to complete litigation.” So, the court ruled, the exception applied. It then agreed with the trial court on the merits, finding the rule invalid.
The Supreme Court of Texas reversed, holding that a “‘public-interest exception’ violates the Texas Constitution’s justiciability limitations.” “Mootness is a constitutional limitation on judicial authority,” the Court emphasized, and not “a matter of judicial administration or prudence.” The Court provided a lengthy analysis of the concept of constitutional justiciability, of which mootness and “the core requirement of a live dispute” (and the corollary ban on advisory judicial opinions) are one part. “[T]he only proper judgment in a moot case,” the Supreme Court said, “is one of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction”—regardless of whether the case is on appeal or still in the trial court—which the Court ruled is the disposition the court of appeals should have reached in this case.
The Court explained that the “capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception” also did not allow the court of appeals to proceed to the merits. That exception, the Supreme Court said, “applies only in rare circumstances.” Specifically, “a plaintiff must prove that ‘(1) the challenged action was too short in duration to be litigated fully before the action ceased or expired; and (2) a reasonable expectation exists that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action again.’” The Court rejected application of that doctrine where, as here, the identical question is capable of repetition, even likely to be repeated, but involving other persons.
