$25-Million Supersedeas Cap Applies Per Judgment Debtor, Not Per Judgment, Not Per Bond

In re Greystar Development & Construction, L.P.
Supreme Court of Texas, No. 24-0293 (May 22, 2026)
Opinion by Justice Busby (linked here), Dissent by Justice Huddle (linked here)

Ken Carroll

Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 52.006(b), which deals with bonds and other security posted to supersede a judgment pending appeal, says, “Notwithstanding any other law or rule of court, when a judgment is for money, the amount of security must not exceed the lesser of: (1) 50 percent of the judgment debtor’s net worth; or (2) $25 million.” But does the $25-million cap in (b)(2) apply per judgment or per judgment-debtor or per bond? In a 5-4 decision—with both the majority and dissent insisting they were “[h]ewing to the text,” “[a]pplying the statute’s plain language,” “adher[ing] to the words the Legislature chose”—the Supreme Court of Texas held that the $25-million statutory cap applies per judgment-debtor.

Three Greystar affiliates were held jointly and severally liable for $360 million in a lawsuit arising from a construction-crane accident. Relying on § 52.006(b)(2), they posted one joint bond in the amount of $25 million and noticed their appeals. Plaintiffs moved for review of the bond, arguing it was insufficient as a matter of law because the $25-million cap of § 52.006(b)(2) applied to each judgment debtor individually, not collectively. The trial court agreed, and the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Greystar entities sought relief in the Supreme Court by mandamus, pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 24.4(a). But by the narrowest of margins, the Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts. The majority drew heavily on the singular, per-debtor formulation of the definition of “security” in § 52.001: “‘security’ means a bond or deposit posted … by a judgment debtor to suspend execution of the judgment ….” Substituting that definition for the word “security” in § 52.006(b), the majority argued, demonstrates legislative intent that the cap be applied on a per-debtor basis: “the amount of [a bond or deposit posted … by a judgment debtor to suspend execution of the judgment] must not exceed … $25 million.” Further, the majority said, interpreting the $25-million cap to apply on a per-debtor basis is consistent with the explicitly per-debtor alternative standard of § 52.006(b)(1)—capping the required security at “50 percent of the judgment debtor’s net worth.” And it aligns with other aspects of appellate practice, such as the requirement that each party seeking to avoid a judgment file its own appeal. Finally, the majority noted anomalies that could arise from not applying the cap on a per-debtor basis when a judgment is affirmed with respect to fewer than all defendants.

The dissent wasn’t buying it. The language of the statute, the dissent argued, unambiguously applies the $25-million cap not on a per-debtor or per-judgment basis, but on a per-bond basis. The dissent recounted Texas’s long history of allowing appealing parties to file one joint bond to supersede a judgment pending appeal and the Legislature’s presumed awareness of that practice. The Legislature, the dissent contended, made no distinction in § 52.006(b) between a bond filed by an individual judgment debtor and a joint bond filed by multiple debtors. So where, as here, defendants who are jointly and severally liable under a judgment seek to supersede that judgment on appeal with one joint bond, the plain language of the statute says the “amount of [that] security,” that bond, is capped at $25 million.

Unless the Legislature amends § 52.006(b) to explicitly say otherwise, however, the $25-million cap will be applied on a per-debtor basis, as interpreted by the majority.