In re State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
Fort Worth Court of Appeals, No. 153-258960-12 (January 26, 2016)
Chief Justice Livingston and Justices Gardner (Opinion) and Gabriel
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals granted mandamus to set aside a new-trial order, applying the new standards laid down by the Texas Supreme Court in Toyota Motor Sales and United Scaffolding. After a fender bender with an underinsured driver, Scott Newell asked his insurer, State Farm, to pay under its underinsured motorist coverage for neck surgery, significant pain, and other injuries he attributed to the accident. State Farm paid part of his claim, and he received some compensation from the other driver’s insurer. Unsatisfied, Newell sued State Farm for additional damages. After trial, the jury awarded Newell $198 for treatment he received at a walk-in clinic the day after the accident, but nothing for the surgery or other medical expenses. The jury also awarded no damages for physical pain, impairment, mental anguish, or lost wages. Because the damage award was more than offset by money Newell had already received from the insurers, the trial court entered a take-nothing judgment. Newell filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court granted, on the ground that the jury’s finding that Newell incurred no compensable pain and suffering was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence and manifestly unjust in light of the jury’s finding that he had sustained a physical injury in the accident.
State Farm sought mandamus to set aside the new trial order. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals noted that Supreme Court requires that the trial court’s order articulate clear, facially valid reasons to set aside the jury’s verdict, and that those reasons be supported by the record. The appellate court held the lower court’s order satisfied the first prong; it provided an understandable, reasonably specific, and facially sound reason for setting aside the jury’s verdict. The second prong, whether the trial court’s stated reasons were correct, required reviewing the entire record under a factual sufficiency analysis. The Court of Appeals noted, “Matters of pain and suffering are necessarily speculative, and it is particularly within the jury’s province to resolve these matters and decide the amounts attributable thereto.” After analyzing the conflicting medical opinions and evidence of Newell’s previous medical treatment and activities following the accident, the Court of Appeals held the jury could reasonably have found he had not suffered ongoing pain caused by the accident. The trial court’s reasons for granting the motion for new trial were therefore invalid, and it was directed to reinstate the original take-nothing judgment.
Showing posts with label Fort Worth Court of Appeals. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Fort Worth Court of Appeals. Show all posts
NOT EVERYTHING IS “FINAL” IN PROBATE
Estate of Tacke
Fort Worth Court of Appeals, No. 02-14-00400-CV (April 2, 2015)
Chief Justice Livingston and Justices Gardner (Opinion) and Walker
Ordinarily an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment that disposes of all issues and all parties in a case. But there are a few exceptions to this rule. Most practitioners are familiar with § 51.014 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which authorizes appeals from a variety of interlocutory orders. Other exceptions are scattered throughout the Texas statutes, and in Tacke the Fort Worth Court of Appeals addressed one—§ 32.001(c) of the Estates Code, which provides for appeal from a “final order” of a probate court. As the Fort Worth Court explained, “[t]he need to review controlling, intermediate decisions before an error can harm later phases of the proceeding justifies modifying the one final judgment rule with respect to probate cases.” So, when is a probate court’s order “final” and appealable under this provision?
In Tacke, a father’s will directed that his residuary estate be divided among his children, 35% to Sandra, 30% to David, and 35% to Roger. The will also directed, however, that certain specific property was to go to each child, with the value of that property counted toward their percentage shares. Roger contended the executors assigned too high a value to certain ranch property left specifically to him, thereby depriving him of his full 35% and leading to overdistributions to his siblings. Roger sought to remove the co-executors; they responded with a petition for declaratory relief confirming their valuation of the disputed ranch property and discharging them from liability regarding their administration of the estate. The executors and Roger filed cross-motions for summary judgment regarding the value of the ranch. The probate court granted Roger’s motion and denied the motion filed by the executors. When the executors appealed, the Fort Worth Court dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Under the Texas Supreme Court’s 1995 decision in Crowson v. Wakeham, for a probate court’s order to be “final” and appealable under § 32.001(c), either (1) there must be a statute expressly declaring the particular phase of the probate proceedings to be final and appealable, or (2) the order must dispose of all issues in the phase in which it was brought. Here, although the probate court’s summary judgment order may have been “final” in a practical sense—establishing the ranch property’s value for remaining probate and estate proceedings—it did not dispose of Roger’s request for the executors’ removal or the executors’ motion for discharge. So, it was not a “final order” appealable under § 32.001(c).
Fort Worth Court of Appeals, No. 02-14-00400-CV (April 2, 2015)
Chief Justice Livingston and Justices Gardner (Opinion) and Walker
Ordinarily an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment that disposes of all issues and all parties in a case. But there are a few exceptions to this rule. Most practitioners are familiar with § 51.014 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which authorizes appeals from a variety of interlocutory orders. Other exceptions are scattered throughout the Texas statutes, and in Tacke the Fort Worth Court of Appeals addressed one—§ 32.001(c) of the Estates Code, which provides for appeal from a “final order” of a probate court. As the Fort Worth Court explained, “[t]he need to review controlling, intermediate decisions before an error can harm later phases of the proceeding justifies modifying the one final judgment rule with respect to probate cases.” So, when is a probate court’s order “final” and appealable under this provision?
In Tacke, a father’s will directed that his residuary estate be divided among his children, 35% to Sandra, 30% to David, and 35% to Roger. The will also directed, however, that certain specific property was to go to each child, with the value of that property counted toward their percentage shares. Roger contended the executors assigned too high a value to certain ranch property left specifically to him, thereby depriving him of his full 35% and leading to overdistributions to his siblings. Roger sought to remove the co-executors; they responded with a petition for declaratory relief confirming their valuation of the disputed ranch property and discharging them from liability regarding their administration of the estate. The executors and Roger filed cross-motions for summary judgment regarding the value of the ranch. The probate court granted Roger’s motion and denied the motion filed by the executors. When the executors appealed, the Fort Worth Court dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Under the Texas Supreme Court’s 1995 decision in Crowson v. Wakeham, for a probate court’s order to be “final” and appealable under § 32.001(c), either (1) there must be a statute expressly declaring the particular phase of the probate proceedings to be final and appealable, or (2) the order must dispose of all issues in the phase in which it was brought. Here, although the probate court’s summary judgment order may have been “final” in a practical sense—establishing the ranch property’s value for remaining probate and estate proceedings—it did not dispose of Roger’s request for the executors’ removal or the executors’ motion for discharge. So, it was not a “final order” appealable under § 32.001(c).
COACH STRIKES OUT UNDER THE TCPA
Bilbrey v. Williams
Fort Worth Court of Appeals, No. 02-13-00332-CV (March 12, 2015)
Justices Dauphinot (Opinion), Gardner, and Meier
Children will be childish. Sometimes grown-ups will be, too. Williams, a 6-foot 5-inch assistant baseball coach in a league for kids seven-and-under, took offense at the league’s inquiry into complaints about his allegedly aggressive and abusive behavior at games generally and toward the league’s young teenage umpires in particular. Rather than work through the process, Williams sued Bilbrey and Hall, another coach and the commissioner of the league, alleging defamation in their communications relating to that inquiry. Bilbrey and Hall moved for dismissal under the Texas anti-SLAPP statute, the TCPA. The trial court denied the motion. But on interlocutory appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed.
The TCPA provides for dismissal of a lawsuit or cause of action based on the defendant’s “exercise of the right of free speech,” which the Act defines as “a communication made in connection with a matter of public concern,” e.g., “health or safety” or “community well-being.” The Court of Appeals held the statements in issue involved the “well-being and safety of children in the community” and therefore were “made in connection with a matter of public concern” and thus covered by the Act. In so doing, the Fort Worth Court rejected the recent holding of the Texarkana Court of Appeals in Whisenhunt v. Lippincott that the TCPA extends only to “speech made in a public forum,” i.e., “speech that rises to such a level that it can be considered participation in government.” Still, even if a plaintiff’s claim is predicated on the defendants’ “exercise of the right of free speech” on a “matter of public concern,” as here, that plaintiff can avoid dismissal under the TCPA if he or she “establishes by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in question.” Conducting a de novo review, the Court of Appeals concluded Williams had not met this burden. So, the Court remanded with instructions that the trial court dismiss Williams’s claims and consider an award of attorney’s fees (mandatory under the Act) and sanctions against him.
Fort Worth Court of Appeals, No. 02-13-00332-CV (March 12, 2015)
Justices Dauphinot (Opinion), Gardner, and Meier
Children will be childish. Sometimes grown-ups will be, too. Williams, a 6-foot 5-inch assistant baseball coach in a league for kids seven-and-under, took offense at the league’s inquiry into complaints about his allegedly aggressive and abusive behavior at games generally and toward the league’s young teenage umpires in particular. Rather than work through the process, Williams sued Bilbrey and Hall, another coach and the commissioner of the league, alleging defamation in their communications relating to that inquiry. Bilbrey and Hall moved for dismissal under the Texas anti-SLAPP statute, the TCPA. The trial court denied the motion. But on interlocutory appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed.
The TCPA provides for dismissal of a lawsuit or cause of action based on the defendant’s “exercise of the right of free speech,” which the Act defines as “a communication made in connection with a matter of public concern,” e.g., “health or safety” or “community well-being.” The Court of Appeals held the statements in issue involved the “well-being and safety of children in the community” and therefore were “made in connection with a matter of public concern” and thus covered by the Act. In so doing, the Fort Worth Court rejected the recent holding of the Texarkana Court of Appeals in Whisenhunt v. Lippincott that the TCPA extends only to “speech made in a public forum,” i.e., “speech that rises to such a level that it can be considered participation in government.” Still, even if a plaintiff’s claim is predicated on the defendants’ “exercise of the right of free speech” on a “matter of public concern,” as here, that plaintiff can avoid dismissal under the TCPA if he or she “establishes by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in question.” Conducting a de novo review, the Court of Appeals concluded Williams had not met this burden. So, the Court remanded with instructions that the trial court dismiss Williams’s claims and consider an award of attorney’s fees (mandatory under the Act) and sanctions against him.
NO APPELLATE JURISDICTION FOR DENIAL OF A DO-OVER CHAPTER 74 MOTION
Texas Cityview Care Center LP v. Foster
Fort Worth Court of Appeals, No. 02-13-00315-CV (February 19, 2015)
Justices Livingston and Gardner (Opinion)
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held it did not have appellate jurisdiction to consider the denial of defendant’s summary judgment motion that was merely a “rebranded” motion to dismiss under Chapter 74. An employee of the defendant rehabilitation facility sued the facility, alleging she was injured while caring for a patient. The defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiff had failed to file an expert report as required by Chapter 74 of the Civil Practice & Remedies Code for all health care liability claims. The trial court denied the motion, and defendant did not exercise its right to appeal under § 74.351(b) of the Civil Practice & Remedies Code. Several weeks later, the defendant later filed a summary judgment motion on the same grounds, which the trial court also denied. This time, the defendant appealed. The Fort Worth Court, however, dismissed the defendant’s interlocutory appeal. The Court held it would have jurisdiction to consider an order that “denies all or part of the relief sought by a motion under Section 74.351(b),” regardless of whether that motion is styled as a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment—i.e., § 74.351(b) is not limited to appeals from the denial of a motion to dismiss. But it did not have jurisdiction in this case because the summary judgment motion was simply a “rebranding” of the previously-denied motion to dismiss, and the defendant waived its right to interlocutory appeal by failing to timely appeal the original order on the motion to dismiss.
Fort Worth Court of Appeals, No. 02-13-00315-CV (February 19, 2015)
Justices Livingston and Gardner (Opinion)
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held it did not have appellate jurisdiction to consider the denial of defendant’s summary judgment motion that was merely a “rebranded” motion to dismiss under Chapter 74. An employee of the defendant rehabilitation facility sued the facility, alleging she was injured while caring for a patient. The defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiff had failed to file an expert report as required by Chapter 74 of the Civil Practice & Remedies Code for all health care liability claims. The trial court denied the motion, and defendant did not exercise its right to appeal under § 74.351(b) of the Civil Practice & Remedies Code. Several weeks later, the defendant later filed a summary judgment motion on the same grounds, which the trial court also denied. This time, the defendant appealed. The Fort Worth Court, however, dismissed the defendant’s interlocutory appeal. The Court held it would have jurisdiction to consider an order that “denies all or part of the relief sought by a motion under Section 74.351(b),” regardless of whether that motion is styled as a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment—i.e., § 74.351(b) is not limited to appeals from the denial of a motion to dismiss. But it did not have jurisdiction in this case because the summary judgment motion was simply a “rebranding” of the previously-denied motion to dismiss, and the defendant waived its right to interlocutory appeal by failing to timely appeal the original order on the motion to dismiss.
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